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WILLIAmI HowARD TAFT: CHIEF JUSTIcE. By Alpheus Thomas Mason. New
York: Simon and Schuster, 1965. Pp. 354. $6.50.
THis "by-product of a comprehensive study of the office and powers of the
Chief Justice of the United States"1 is not the elaborate, personal and profes-
sional history that we might have expected of the biographer of Stone and
Brandeis. Rather, it is a perceptive portrait of William Howard Taft in such
varied capacities as judicial reformer, lobbyist and jurist. Its sources, appro-
priately recognized, are Henry Pringle's biography of Taft published in 1939,2
the subsequent large body of legal literature, (including Mason's own writ-
ings) on Taft and other judges, and the Taft papers in the Library of Con-
gress. It should provoke thought concerning judicial biography, Taft himself,
and the unique judicial institution over which he presided for nearly a decade.
If biography, as we now know it, is a recently developed art, judicial biog-
raphy may be called hyper-modern. Justice Frankfurter, whose own reminis-
cences are so fascinating, expressed the view in 1948 that "most worlds of
exciting judicial biography still remain to be conquered." However, discern.
ing biographies of Taney, Field, Miller, Hughes and others challenge the Jus-
tice's statement that "[o]nly of Marshall have we an adequate biography.' 4
More recently, Mark de Wolfe Howe's studies of Justice Holmes promise us
the major achievement in this field; and no recent book has made so thorough
a study of a Justice's decisions as Fowler Harper's Justice Rutledge and the
Bright Constellation.
The political scientists have frequently written better judicial biography than
the lawyers and, Lord Campbell notwithstanding, Supreme Court Justices are
a more interesting subject than their British counterparts who have done their
more exciting work as trial lawyers. The reason is the same: the public law
aspects of the Supreme Court require political and social, as well as legal
evaluation.
The need for such biographical material is suggested by Justice Frankfurter's
observation that "the work of the Supreme Court is the history of relatively
few personalities.... The fact that they were 'there' and that others were not,
surely made decisive differences." That Taft got "there" can be explained
largely by a combination of ambition, politics, and attractive personality. Al-
though Holmes said Taft "did well as a judge," he questioned whether Taft
could "go higher than first rate second rate." No lawyer in our history took
1. MAsoN, Acknowledgments.
2. PRINGLE, THE LIFE AND TIMES OF WILLIAM HoNvARD TAFT (1939).
3. Frankfurter, The Writing of Judicial Biography, 24 IND. L. REv. 363, 367 (1949).
4. Ibid. This view of Beveridge's Marshall was qualified somewhat by the confession
that "time has lessened for me the significance of Beveridge's Marshall." Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. 1 HOLMEs-LAsIi LETRs 346 (Howe ed. 1953). It is interesting to note that
Holmes' distinguished ancestor Wendell Phillips once described Lincoln as "a first-rate,
econd-rate man." MCPHERSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR EoUALITY: AmOLITIONISTS, AND TILL
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the Chief Justiceship as the fixed star in his constellation so early and stead-
fastly as Taft. The greater judges, Holmes and Augustus Hand, could not com-
prehend such ambition.7 There is something unseemly in this undistinguished
nisi prius judge seeking a Supreme Court appointment at the age of thirty-two.
For, in 1890, the day of intellectual prodigies like Hamilton, Jefferson and
Story was long past. One is not mollified by Taft's modesty: "My chances of
going to the moon and of donning a silk gown at the hands of President Har-
rison are about equal."8 His close attention to the failing health of Supreme
Court Justices whose positions he desired, even his presidential nomination
of White instead of Hughes for Chief Justice, have a touch of Richard III.
White's principal qualification seemed that of age, giving Taft a greater hope
of an ultimate vacancy on the bench which he could fill.
Taft came from a politically and socially prominent family; his father had
been a member of President Grant's Cabinet, a state court judge and a foreign
Minister. The elder Taft had set the stage by advising Chief Justice Waite of
his own availability for Supreme Court appointment. It is less clear from
Mason than from Pringle precisely how important this background was in
Taft's life; the Taft heritage seems to have enjoyed continued viability, and
one can observe similar patterns of power in families so politically varied as
the Roosevelts, the Tydings and the Morgenthaus.
Taft became a state Assistant Prosecuting Attorney at twenty-seven and
Solicitor General of the United States at thirty-two. Mason characterizes his
performance in the latter position as "undistinguished" although we have only
Taft's modest agreement in support.'0 Taft recognized that the position proved
important for his entire political and judicial career because of his political as-
sociations in Washington. Subsequently, Taft was appointed to a federal Cir-
cuit Court where his decisions caused Samuel Gompers to label him the "father
of injunctions." His work as President of the Philippine Commission and as
first Civil Governor of the Philippines appears to have been of first-rate com-
NEGRO IN THE CIIL WA I AND RECONSTRUCTION 113 (1964); Srmwtr, THE ERA oF RE-
CONSTRUCTION, 1865-77 44 (1965). Oddly enough, Bickel ascribes to Brandeis the following
comment on Taft: "He is a first-rate, second-rate mind." BicrEL, Tn UzrumisuE
OPINIONs OF M1LR JUsTICE BRANDEIS 203 (1957).
7. Holmes wrote Pollock: "Taft did not surprise me by saying (according to the
papers) that the CJ-ship had been the ambition of his life. I think I wrote what I thought
of that kind of ambition as against the aspiration to touch the superlative in one's work."
I HoLmEs-LAsKi Lz-rErs 346 (Howe ed. 1953); 2 Hor.uEFs-PoLu.cr LL-rnns 72 (Howe
ed. 1941). Hand, writing Brandeis about himself, said that he was "almost abnormally
without ambition:' NVYzANsxI, WHEREAS - A JUDaa's PRmsnss 70 (1965).
8. MAsoN 17.
9. In Mason's view, President Taft probably assumed that White's appointment would
facilitate his own as Whites successor. MAsoN 35-40. Another view is that Vhite's fellow
Justices urged his appointment. 1 PRINGLE, THE LIFE AND Tnrms oF WrVi= HoWARD
TAFT 534-35 (1939). For a third: "I don't know what the influences vere that led Taft
to name White. I never ventured to ask him." 1 HoLnms-LAsrr LrrtRS 797 (Howe ed.
1953) ; see also 2 HoLu s-LAsKi LETTERS 846 (Howe ed. 1953).
10. MASON 18.
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petence; his devotion to it led him to reject Theodore Roosevelt's offer of
appointment as an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court." His Presidency,
which he owed to his wife's ambition and Roosevelt's friendship, disappointed
himself and others.
Taft has meaning in the context of a period of American history marked by
the new concentration of economic and political power in the great corpora-
tions. The revolt against such power is reflected in the very names of Green-
backers, Grangers, Populists, Knights of Labor, and Anarchists; in Haymar-
ket, Homestead, Pullman, Coxey's Army, and in the largest Socialist vote ever
cast in a presidential election. In the 1890's, many forward-looking and respect-
able citizens were concerned about the power of this new wealth and the suffer-
ing of the working class. Mason shows that Taft, imbued with the respective
social and legal philosophies of William Sumner and Justice Brewer, was more
frightened by the popular revolt than affronted by its causes. His constitutional
creed was simple: the main purpose of the Constitution was to protect private
property. "[P]rincely profits" were proper for "men of judgment, courage and
executive ability... for the general good they have done."12 The courts were
necessary for the protection of the rich because "[t] he appeal of the rich to the
Constitution and courts for protection is still an appeal by the weak against the
unjust aggressions of the strong."13 Taft agreed that there were corporate evils,
but those he believed were the result of political corruption which was "beyond
the power of the Federal courts to prevent or eradicate." 14 On the other hand,
when organized labor committed "open defiant trespass upon property rights"'1
the labor injunction was a necessary weapon.
Taft has a reputation for concern with the administration of justice. The
praise given to him for his speeches on judicial reform and for his criticism of
the "unequal burden which the delays and expenses of litigation under our
system impose on the poor litigant" 10 may be deserved; but since he regarded
the constitutional rights of the accused as "fetishes,"' 17 his efforts were hardly
a crusade for social justice. Rather, viewing the courts as guardians of property
rights, he apparently recognized the critical importance of having an instrument
effective for, and judges sympathetic to, the task.
His concern with both the machinery of the courts and their personnel is
probably the most interesting and informative aspect of his judicial career. The
11. It is not unfair to note that the Chief Justiceship was Taft's objective and that
Mrs. Taft was insistent upon the Presidency and opposed to a judicial post for her
husband. MASON 17, 27. Under Roosevelt's pressure, Taft did accept an appointment as
Secretary of War. MASON 24.
12. Taft, The Right to Private Property. 3 MicH. L.J. 215, 223 (1894).
13. Id. at 232.
14. Taft, Criticisms of the Federal Judiciary, 29 Ams. L. Rzv. 641, 652-53 (1895).
15. Id. at 669.
16. Taft, The Delays of the Law, 18 YA=E L.J. 28, 30-31 (1908).
17. Administration of Criminal Law, Address to the Graduating Class of the Yale
Law School, 1905, reprinted in TAFT, PRESENT DAY PROBLEMS: A COLLECTION o AD-
DRESSEs DELIvERED ON VAIous OccAsIoNs 333, 337 (1908).
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story of Taft's success in securing the passage of the Act of September 14,
1922 18 creating the judicial conference and giving the Chief Justice a powerful
administrative weapon is now well known. The prestige of a Chief Justice and
former President, his indefatigability before Bar Associations and Congress,
and his organizational ability also resulted in passage of the Judges' Bill of
1925,19 which substantially reduced the obligatory jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court. Frankfurter, otherwise critical, is unstinting in his praise of this phase
of Taft's work.2
What is a newer tale - and one now being told by Mason and others
is Taft's ceaseless intervention to assure the filling of federal judicial positions
by "sound" men. Brandeis' nomination made Taft say bitterly that "es ist zume
lachen,"21 and he led the bitter and unsuccessful campaign against confirma-
tion. He opposed Learned Hand because while on the district bench he had run
on the Bull Moose ticket for the Court of Appeals. Cardozo was "what they
call a progressive judge"22 and even Cuthbert Pound was a "kind of an off-
horse," who had "dissented with Cardozo."' 3
Any study of Taft poses the question of how active the Chief Justice should
be in political affairs generally and in political appointments particularly.
There are many sound reasons for a strict construction and application of the
separation of powers doctrine which go beyond Hayburn's Case. 2 4 Whether or
not national crises may justify publicly disclosed exceptions, a close private
working relationship between the judicial and other branches of the govern-
ment is wrong doctrinally, dangerous politically, and not justified practically
by the familiar claim of a shortage of qualified non-judicial presidential ad-
visors. In any event, Taft went to an extreme in his persistent lobbying for and
against particular judges, other public office-holders, tariffs, veterans' bonuses,
and general legislation. However convinced he was that his actions were for
the country's good, this behavior, whose propriety he and others questioned,
hardly makes for impartiality in adjudicating disputes between the citizen and
his government. Mason's description of Chief Justice Taft's campaign to make
Pierce Butler an Associate Justice of the Court is not a pretty picture. It was
18. 42 Stat. 837 (1922).
19. 43 Stat. 936 (1925). Taft also unsuccessfully sought to secure rule-making power
for the Court; not until 1934 did Congress grant such authority. 48 Stat. 1064 (1934).
20. FAxFxamTER & LAins, THE BusrEss OF THE SuanRmE Court 235, 241-42,
259-60 (1927) ; Frankfurter, Chief Justices I Have Known, 39 VA. L Rzv. 883, 893 (1953),
reprinted in FpAwxrmm, OF LAw Amot MzEi 129-30 (1956).
21. Letter, Taft to Gus Karger, January 31, 1916, quoted at MfAsoN 72.
22. 1oN 170. Taft also feared that Cardozo and Hand might "herd" with Holmes
and Brandeis. and that Stimson was infected with "Frankdurtismn" MAsoN 163.
23. MsoN 171. Mason suggests that Pound was objectionable because he "had writ-
ten the first judicial opinion in America upholding Workmen's Compensation." MAsor.
171, citing as support Ives v. South Buffalo Ry. Co. 201 N.Y. 271 (1911), which held
the Workmen's Compensation Law unconstitutional. Pound did not sit on the court that
decided the case, or on the court that overruled it in Matter of Jensen v. Southern Pacific
Co., 215 N.Y. 514 (1915) ; Pound was appointed to the Court of Appeals August 20, 1915.
24. 2 DalU. 408 (1792).
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highly improper for Taft secretly to mobilize the Catholic hierarchy in the West
to offset that of the East, even if Martin Manton was the latter's candidate and
Pierce Butler was a sound railroad lawyer.
As Chief Justice, Taft fulfilled his non-judicial functions most competently.
Holmes' correspondence emphasizes Taft's ability in the field of administrative
detail, his achievement of greater harmony in conference than his predecessor,
and his success in disposal of the docket.25 Everyone agrees that Taft was a
genial, likeable man, and it must have been so. "We are very happy with the
present Chief," wrote Holmes, "as I may have told you. He is good humored,
laughs readily, not quite rapid enough, but keeping things moving pleasantly." "
He was a great compromiser and was sometimes successful in preventing dis-
sents or dissenting opinions. Taft also carried a heavy work load, assigned
uninteresting cases to himself, and was helpful in the personal affairs of his
fellow Justices.
No one appears to have made a detailed study of Taft's decisions, particu-
larly in the Supreme Court. Mason's "Constitutional Creed" chapter sets forth
the judicial decisions for which Taft is best known. They make strange reading
today, particularly most of the labor decisions. Under Taft, peaceful picketing
was permitted, secondary boycotts were enjoined, and the anti-trust laws were
vigorously applied against labor unions, although he was persuaded by Bran-
deis in the first Coronado case 27 to require proof of the union's intention to
restrain interstate commerce. Later decisions, such as Apex Hosiery Co. v.
Leader,28 have wiped out all trace of Taft's influence. Taft's chef d'oeuvre was
Truax v. Corrigan,29 declaring unconstitutional the Arizona anti-injunction
law. This was destroyed by successor courts influenced by Brandeis and Frank-
furter,30 not to mention Frankfurter and Greene.3' Taft's dissent from the
Court's minimum wage decision in Adkins,3 2 unlike his views on federal child
labor regulation,33 is now the law.34 Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial
Relations,a0 declaring unconstitutional the Kansas compulsory arbitration law,
would probably be decided the same way today, and Mason's view that its
"principle was the same" as that of Adkins is questionable.30
In the non-labor field, Mason discusses principally Taft's views on the Presi-
25. 2 HOLMES-PoLLOCK LErrERs 79, 113-14, 205 (Howe ed. 1941).
26. Id. at 96.
27. United Mineworkers of America v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344 (1922).
28. 310 U.S. 469 (1940).
29. 257 U.S. 312 (1921). Holmes thought it "rather spongy." 1 HoLms-LAsni Lrrimt
390 (Howe ed. 1953).
30. See, e.g., Senn v. Tile Layers Union, 301 U.S. 468 (1937) and Lauf v. E. G.
Shinner & Co., 303 U.S. 323 (1938).
31. Tim LAxOR I'JUNCrION (1930).
32. Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
33. Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20 (1922).
34. See, e.g., West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); United States
v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
35. 262 U.S. 522 (1923).
36. MAsoN 251.
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dent's removal power 3 7 and on wire-tapping.38 The Court later came to a dif-
ferent conclusion on the first issue 39 and Congress disposed of the Onlistcad
case by passing the Communications Act of 1934.40 Mason, like Holmes, gives
Taft credit for his broad conception, following Marshall's lead, of the federal
power over interstate commerce.' Some of the most interesting of what we
now call First Amendment cases are not discussed by Mason. I refer to such
cases as Gitlow, Schwimner,;4 Pierce 44 and Meyer.4G A full study of Taft as
Chief Justice would also include analysis of Uvited States v. La;za 40 on the
two-sovereignty rule, McGrain v. Daugherty 47 on the congressional power of
investigation, Carroll v. United States48 on search and seizure, and Berizzi
Bros. v. S. S. Pesaro 49 on sovereign immunity. The last decade has seen many
significant variations of these themes.
The work of the Supreme Court in Taft's period was quite different from
that of the present time. In part, this was due to Taft's success in ultimately
securing passage of the Judges' Bill. Before its passage the cases which the
Court was required to decide usually involved matters of statutory construc-
tion, private law and jurisdiction. It is odd to note Holmes' comment to Pol-
lock on the "pretty important cases"50 which he was deciding. What would he
have said about Youngstown, Dennis, Barenblatt, Sabbatino and Doinbrow-
ski?51 The change in the Court's work was due to at least two factors other
than the limitation of its obligatory jurisdiction: the New Deal legislation
(which ran counter to Taft's views on private property, labor and judicial re-
view), and the state and federal legislation inspired by the fear of international
Communism which has replaced domestic Populism as our bte noire.
One can fairly guess how Brandeis and Holmes would have reacted to the
New Deal legislation, if we pass over some of the "delegation running riot."32
How they (although not Taft) would have reacted to the "anti-Communist"
37. Myers v. United States 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
38. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
39. Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
40. 48 Stat 1064, 1103; 47 U.S.C. § 3605 (1934). See Nardone v. United States, 303
U.S. 338 (1939); United States v. Coplon, 185 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1950) cert. dcifrcd 342
U.S. 920 (1952).
41. Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495 (1922).
42. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
43. United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644 (1929).
44. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
45. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
46. 260 U.S. 377 (1922).
47. 273 U.S. 135 (1927).
48. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
49. 271 U.S. 562 (1926).
50. 2 HoLatEs-PoLLocz: LErrnas 95 (Howe ed. 1941).
51. Youngstown Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952); Dennis v. United States, 341
U.S. 494 (1951) ; Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959) ; Banco Nacional de
Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964); Dombrowski v. Pfister, No. 52, Oct. Term,
1964,33 U.S.L. WN= 4321.
52. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 553 (1935).
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legislation is a matter of speculation. Would the realistic Brandeis and the
skeptical Holmes have been less likely than their distinguished junior, Felix
Frankfurter, to accept the government's double barrelled argument of national
emergency and legislative discretion? The problems which have faced the Court
in recent years are more difficult than those decided by the Taft Court. They
call for greater men; the modern judges, on the whole, are intellectually su-
perior, write better opinions, and, it must be admitted, much longer ones.
Professor Mason does not discuss Taft's teaching career as professor of con-
stitutional law at Yale College and Law School. It appears to have been un-
distinguished.53 Taft gave his students the working knowledge of government
which he certainly possessed. He supplemented this work on the lecture cir-
cuit. He would not have approved of today's Journal or of the Dean's recent
reports on the philosophy of the law school and on the scholarly and forensic
achievements of its faculty. But the Journal and the reports were also different
in Taft's day. It is a long step from Taft's teaching of constitutional law to
that of Professor Emerson and his colleagues.
Professor Mason's book says little that has not been said elsewhere by him
or by others. The pre-1939 materials are for the most part to be fouild in
Pringle. Taft's intra-court amiability, tactics and reduction of dissents are dis-
cussed more fully in Walter F. Murphy's Elements of Judicial Strategy; the
same author has elsewhere discussed Taft's court-packing operations." The
Coronado situation is excellently analyzed elsewhere by Professor Bickel."
Taft's fight against Brandeis and his support of Butler are the respective sub-
jects of two recent books.56 Taft's constitutional views are discussed in Mason's
The Supreme Court from Taft td Warren."
There is also some repetition within the book under discussion, e.g., some
of the same cases are discussed in the different chapters treating of Taft's
judicial creed and his functioning as Chief Justice. More important, I ques-
tion Professor Mason's statement that "[t]he irony of . . . [Taft's] career is
that the revisions he sponsored and pushed through to enactment should now
be helpful to causes he profoundly distrusted."' 8 Mason speaks in this fashion
of the "remodeled Federal judicial organization," Taft's "broad construction of
the commerce power," and his "support of the minimum wage" as contributing
to "the dreaded collectivism he had struggled desperately to prevent."50
53. HicKs, WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT, YALE PROFESSOR oF LAW AND NEW HAVEN4
CriTzEx (1945).
54. Murphy, In His Own Image: Mr. Chief Justice Taft and Supremne Couirt Ap-
pointments, 1961 Sup. CT. REV. 159; Murphy, Chief Justice Taft and the Lower Court
Bureaucracy: A Study in Judicial Administration, 24 J. POL. 453 (1962).
55. BICKEL, THE UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS OF MR. JsTIcE BRANDEIS 77-99 (1957).
56. TODD, JusTIcE ON TRIAL: THE CASE OF Louis D. BRANDEIS (1964); DANELSy,
A SUPREME COURT JUSTICE Is APPOINTED (1964).
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But some mechanism would eventually have been created to limit the im-
possibly growing work load even if the Court had been forced to improvise
without legislation, and certainly the Supreme Court's decisions upholding
New Deal legislation found their real inspiration in Marshall's views on federal
power, in the urgent economic necessities of the 1930's and in the changes in
the Court's membership.
Despite the absence of original material, this is a worthwhile book to have
and to use. It is well written, less discursive (though less original) than Prin-
gle's; it brings up to date the additional materials and puts them in a single
readable volume. Some chapters, such as that on judicial reform, discuss as-
pects of Taft's work more coherently than have been done elsewhere. The
numerous quotations from Taft and others are illuminating rather than dis-
tracting. The book gives us another look behind the judicial curtain with the
aid of that dreaded modem weapon, intra-court memoranda, as well as of
the uninhibited private correspondence between the Chief Justice and his rela-
tives. As Matthew Josephson wrote of Pringle's biography, Mason's "attitude
toward the hero is a mixture of decent sympathy and pained critical disap-
proval."60 With the added knowledge of the years, Mason quite properly shows
less of the first quality and more of the second. Mason's words may not be
harsh but the resulting portrait is merciless. The reader is left with melancholy
in the reminder that well-meaning men often make up that "blind" Court 0 1
of which Taft himself wrote, that our governmental masters are usually not
great men, and that under their guidance each age finds new devils to exorcise.
LEONARD B. BounN
EQUALITY IN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY. By Sanford A. Lakoff. Harvard Uni-
versity Press, 1964. Pp. 270.
THE LBERAI. IDEA OF FREEDOM. By David Spitz. The University of Arizona
Press, 1964. Pp. 210.
THESE studies of the political ideals of Liberty and Equality may serve to
remind us, in the first place, of the unfortunate decline of the third ideal of the
French Revolution. Political philosophies appear to be unacquainted with the
ideal of Fraternity, and practical politicians, at once cynical and mawkish, pre-
fer to invoke the unavailable powers of Love. The memorable modern con-
siderations of the notion of fraternity - Dostoyevsky's, Freud's, Malraux's -
are not philosophical in manner, nor are they designed to enforce fraternity as
a political ideal. Freud's totemic brotherhood confronts the ideal of fraternity
with the impulse to fratricide, and the Illusha brotherhood inspired by Alyosha
Karamazov is pointedly extra-political. Malraux may seem to provide an ex-
60. Josephson, Taft in His Times, 101 The New Republic 174 (Nov. 29, 1939).
61. Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20, 37 (1922).
Member of the New York Bar.
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